Civil Procedure by University of the Pacific
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 19
1-1-1974
Civil Procedure
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Legislation Commons
This Greensheet is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law, Civil Procedure, 5 Pac. L. J. 266 (1974).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol5/iss1/19
Civil Procedure
Civil Procedure; administrative hearings-quorums
Government Code § 11512 (amended).
AB 397 (Z'berg); STATS 1973, Ch 231
Support: State Bar of California
Chapter 231 has amended Section 11512 of the Government Code
to codify existing case law on the procedurel to be followed in an
administrative hearing when a quorum ceases to exist [See Cooper
v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. 2d 242, 217 P.2d 630
(1950); Feist v. Rowe, 3 Cal. App. 3d 404, 415-20, 83 Cal. Rptr.
465, 472-75 (1970)]. Section 11512(e) has been added to provide
that after an agency has commenced to hear a case with a hearing
officer presiding and a quorum no longer exists, the hearing officer
shall complete the hearing as if sitting alone and is to render a pro-
posed decision in accordance with subdivision (b) of Section 11517
of the Government Code (which provides that the agency may adopt
or reject the decision in its entirety, or may reduce the proposed penalty
and adopt the balance of the proposed decision).
See Generally:
1) STATn B OF CALIFORNI, 1972 CONFmENCE RESOLUTION 9-15.
Civil Procedure; admissibility of medical foundation's records
Evidence Code §1157.5 (new).
AB 2478 (Murphy); STATS 1973, Ch 848
Section 1157 of the Evidence Code provides that neither the pro-
ceedings nor the records of either organized committees of medical
staffs in hospitals having the responsibility of evaluation and improve-
ment of the quality of care rendered in the hospital or medical review
committees of local medical societies shall be subject to discovery. Any
person attending a meeting of such committee cannot be required to
testify about the meeting. The prohibition concerning discovery and
testimony does not apply to: (1) a statement made by any person in
attendance at such a meeting who is a party to an action or proceed-
ing the subject matter of which was reviewed at the meeting; (2)
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any person requesting hospital staff privileges; (3) any action against
an insurance carrier alleging bad faith by the carrier in refusing to
accept a settlement offer within the policy limits; (4) medical society
committees containing more than ten percent of the members of the
medical society; or (5) any committee in which the conduct or practice
of a person serving on the committee is being reviewed.
Section 1157.5 has been added to extend the protection offered
by Section 1157 to the organized committee of any nonprofit medical
care foundation which meets the following two conditions: (1) the
foundation is a component or subsidiary of a medical society; and
(2) it is organized in a manner which makes available professional
competence to review health care services with respect to medical ne-
cessity, quality of care, or economic justification of charges or level
of care. This protection is not available in actions where the provider
of health care services is seeking to recover payment for such services.
Civil Procedure; attachment-notice of hearing
Code of Civil Procedure §538.2 (amended).
SB 216 (Deukmejian); STATS 1973, Ch 8
(Effective March 14, 1973)
Support: Los Angeles County Municipal Court Judges' Association
Prior to amendment, Section 538.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
[S.B. 1048, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 550, §10] required that the hearing
on whether a writ of attachment shall issue was to be held seven
business days after the service of notice upon the defendant or upon
the first regular date law and motion matters were heard thereafter,
whichever occurred later. Since the date of service could not be deter-
mined when the court issued the notice of hearing, the court could
not set the date for the hearing at that time. Chapter 8 remedies
this problem by requiring that: (1) the notice of hearing specify the
date of the hearing; (2) the notice specify a hearing date not less
than 10 days nor more than 30 days from the date of its issuance;
and (3) the notice of hearing be served on the defendant at least
10 days prior to the date of the hearing except as otherwise ordered
by the court for good cause.
See Generally:
1) 2 WrN-, CALIFORNIA PocEDua, Provisional Remedies §§24-38 (2d ed. 1971);
§24a (Supp. 1972).
2) Jackson, Attachment in California-What Now?, 3 PAc. L.J. 1 (1972).
3) Comment, Attachment in California: Senate Bill 1048, the Interim Response to
Randone, 4 PAc. L.. 146 (1973).
4) 4 PAc. L.J, REvrmw oF SELEcTED 1972 CALEFoNRm LEGIsLATION 281, 292 (1973).
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Civil Procedure; attachment and execution-
housetrailer exemption
Code of Civil Procedure §690.3 (amended).
AB 778 (Wilson); STATs 1973, Ch 787
Section 690.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been amended
to increase the exemption from attachment and execution (as provided
in §690 et seq.) for a housetrailer or mobilehome in which the debtor,
or family of such debtor, actually resides. The exemption has been
increased from a value not exceeding $9,500 to a value not exceeding
$15,000 over and above all liens and encumbrances on that house-
trailer or mobilehome. The exemption is not allowed if the debtor
or the spouse of the debtor has an existing homestead as provided
by Title 5 (commencing with § 1237) of the Civil Code.
COMMENT
The purpose of increasing the exemption provided mobilehome own-
ers from $9,500 to $15,000 is to provide such owners the same protec-
tion from attachment and execution as conventional homeowners are
provided by the homestead law. A homeowner claiming a homestead
is allowed an exemption not exceeding $20,000 above all lens and
encumbrances [CAL. CIV. CODE §1260]. Owners of mobilehomes and
housetrailers usually did not qualify for the homestead exemption be-
cause they did not own the land on which they lived as required by
Section 1237 of the Civil Code. This resulted in most mobilehome
owners being inadequately protected by the $9,500 exemption since
eighty percent of mobilehomes cost between $17,000 and $30,000 [As-
semblyman Bob Wilson, Press Release, May 2, 1973].
See Generally:
1) 5 WrTKIN, CALIFORNIA PRocEDURE, Enforcement of Judgment §55 (2d ed. 1971).
2) CoNINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICE
§§19.1-19.44 (1968).
3) 2 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1970 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 320, 326, 323
(1971).
4) 4 PAC. L.J., REvIEw OF SELECTED 1972 CALFORNIA LEGISLATION 297 (1973).
Civil Procedure; civil arrest
Code of Civil Procedure §§477, 1168, Chapter 1 (commencing
with §478), Chapter 3 (commencing with §1143) (repealed);
Chapter 1 (commencing with §477) (new); §§340, 515, 539, 667,
682, 684, 804, 1014 (amended); Government Code §§26681,
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26682, 26683, 26684, 26686 (repealed); §§202, 27823, 71265
(amended).
SB 81 (Song); STArs 1973, Ch 20
Support: California Law Revision Commission
Prohibits civil arrest in civil action for debt or tort; repeals pro-
visions for civil arrest and bail; deletes provisions for execution
against person of judgment debtor; repeals provisions for discharge
of persons imprisoned on civil process; eliminates liability of sheriff,
constable, marshal, or other officer who allows a prisoner ar-
rested or imprisoned on civil process to escape.
Section 478 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been added by
Chapter 20 to provide that a person may not be imprisoned, before
or after judgment, in a civil action for a debt or tort. It also provides
that nothing in the section affects any power a court may have to
imprison a person who violates a court order (i.e., a person may still
be jailed for civil contempt). Section 202 of the Government Code
has been amended to delete the provision that the state could imprison
or confine an individual for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies.
Chapter 1 (commencing with §478) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which specified the provisions for civil arrest and bail, has been re-
pealed.
Sections 667, 682, and 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure have
been amended to reflect the fact that a writ of execution may not
issue against the person of a judgment debtor after an execution against
his property is returned unsatisfied. Section 1168, which provided
for arrest of the defendant in an unlawful detainer proceeding, has
been repealed, and Section 804 has been amended to delete the provi-
sion authorizing pretrial arrest in a quo warranto proceeding for usur-
pation of any public office, civil or military, or a franchise. Sections
1143-1154, which provided for discharge of persons imprisoned on
civil process, have also been repealed. Persons imprisoned for civil
contempt may still obtain their release upon a subsequent inability
to comply with a court order by a writ of habeas corpus [CAL. PEN.
CODE §§1485, 1487(2)].
Sections 26681, 26682, 26683, 26684, and 26686 of the Govern-
ment Code, which dealt with the liabilities and rights of a sheriff
who allowed a prisoner arrested or imprisoned on civil process to es-
cape, have been repealed.
COMMENT
Prior to repeal by this chapter, Section 479 of the Code of Civil
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Procedure authorized use of the provisional remedy of civil arrest and
bail in only five classes of cases based on fraud. These were: (1)
an action for the recovery of money on a contract when the defend-
ant was about to leave the state to defraud his creditors; (2) an action
against a public officer or any other person in a fiduciary capacity
for fine, penalty, embezzlement, misconduct or neglect in office or
in professional employment, or willful violation of duty; (3) an action
to recover unjustly detained personal property if it had been concealed,
removed, or disposed of to prevent its taking; (4) when the defendant
fraudulently incurred the obligation on which the action was brought;
and (5) when the defendant had or was about to remove or dispose
of his property with intent to defraud his creditors. Section 804 pro-
vided for a pretrial arrest in a quo warranto proceeding for usurpation
of any public office or a franchise, and Section 1168 provided for
arrest of the defendant in an unlawful detainer proceeding. An arrest
was executed on ex parte application prior to judgment, and the person
jailed was not released until he either posted bail, made a cash deposit
to cover a possible future judgment, or demonstrated that the arrest
was improper [CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. §§486, 503, 504, 505(b), prior
to repeal by CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 20]. After judgment a creditor
could also get an execution against the body of a debtor in those
cases where arrest was available. The debtor was imprisoned until
either the creditor consented to his release, the creditor failed to con-
tinue advancing money to the jailer to cover the expense of keeping
the debtor in jail, or until the debtor took the pauper's oath [CAL.
CODE CIV. PRoc. §§1148-1149, prior to repeal by, CAL. STATS. 1973,
c. 20]. Civil arrest on execution following judgment was not ex-
pressly provided for by statute but it was implied by Sections 667,
682(3), 684, and 1143 through 1154 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which have been repealed by this chapter.
The prejudgment remedy of arrest and bail was designed to bring
the defendant within the reach of the court's final process [See Carra-
dine v. Carradine, 75 Cal. App. 2d 775, 171 P.2d 911 (1946)] and
to assure satisfaction of judgment [See In re Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486,
489 n.3, 446 P.2d 148, 150 n.3, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340, 342 n.3 (1968)].
But, the modern procedures of service of process and the use of de-
fault judgments [See CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §§585, 594] have made
civil arrest and bail obsolete as a process to obtain jurisdiction; and
attachment of property [See CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §§537-561]
or a temporary restraining order and injunction to prohibit disposition
of assets [See CAL. CODE CV. PROC. §§525-535] have made civil
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arrest and bail obsolete as a process to assure security for the prospec-
tive judgment.
Arrest on execution was used to enforce judgment but postjudgment
incarceration only prevented the debtor from working to improve his
ability to settle the debt and was worthless if the debtor were released
by taking the pauper's oath [See CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §§1148-1149,
prior to repeal by CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 20]. Thus this did little
to assure satisfaction of judgment. Also, arrest on execution was used
to reach concealed property the creditor could not reach. This proce-
dure, however, sometimes had the harsh effect of requiring the debtor
to give up exempt property to obtain release from jail. Examination of
the debtor in supplementary proceedings (pursuant to CAL. CODE Civ.
PRoc. §§714-723) did not have this harsh effect and consequently was
more acceptable than civil arrest. Since this process, in addition to being
ineffectual, was costly for the creditor [See CAL. CODIE CIv. PRoc.
§1154, prior to repeal by CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 20 (creditor must pay
cost of debtor's imprisonment)], it would seem that the primary pur-
pose for arrest on execution in debt collection process was its nuisance
value.
Civil arrest may also have violated procedural due process of law
as developed in some recent cases. Morrissey v. Brewer [408 U.S.
471 (1972)] provided that a person's parole cannot be revoked with-
out a notice and a hearing thereby affording the defendant an oppor-
tunity to be heard. The Court stated that parole revocation constituted
a deprivation of liberty and that the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment which protects a person's liberty was not satisfied
in such a case without notice and a hearing. Analogizing to this
decision, the system of arrest and bail eliminated by Chapter 20 prob-
ably violated due process protections in that the defendant was not
afforded prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corporation [395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment gar-
nishment of wages)] and Randone v. Appellate Department [5 Cal.
3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971) (prejudgment at-
tachment of property)] also lend support to this proposition. Under
these decisions, the property of a defendant generally could not be
seized absent prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing, nor could
a defendant's necessities of life be seized absent a judicial determina-
tion of the actual validity of the plaintiffs claim. While arrest does
not amount to deprivation of a substantial property right, the due
process clause applies with even greater force to deprivations of liberty
than to deprivations of property [See Lynch v. Household Finance
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Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (protection in civil rights statutes against
prejudgment garnishment) ].
Imprisonment on execution may also be attacked on due process
grounds. Although many arguments center around the concept that
imprisonment for debt offended fundamental social values [Rogge, A
Technique for Change, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 481 (1964)], perhaps
the most commonly expressed concern is that civil arrest imposes harsh
and burdensome penalties in cases in which the judgment might well
have been taken in default or in which the debtor had had none of
the safeguards of a criminal trial, such as burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt [Freedman, Imprisonment for Debt, 2 TEMPLE L.Q.
330 (1928); Comment, Due Process-Pretrial Civil Arrest, 58 CAL. L.
REv. 178 (1970)].
Apparently in logical sequence to the above-mentioned court deci-
sions, which exposed the constitutional infirmities of civil arrest and
bail, and in response to the concerns of the many legal scholars
who have written on the subject, the legislature has finally eliminated
this ineffective, occasionally abused, and rarely used means of securing
payment of a debt.
See Generally:
1) 2 WrnrK, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Provisional Remedies §§1-7 (1970).
2) 5 WrrxiN, CALnFoRNu PROCEDURE, Enforcement of Judgment §§177-178 (1971).
3) 3 CAL PRAcnE, Arrest §§17:1-17:51 (1968).
4) 7 CAL PRAcTicn, Enforcement of Judgment §§56:215-56:219 (1968).
5) Jackson, Attachment In California-What Now?, 3 PAc. L.J. 1, 11 (1972).
6) Sterling, Study Relating to Civil Arrest in California, 11 CAL. LAW REVISION
COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STuDIES 27-37 (1972).
7) CALiFNomA LAW REVISION CoifaIssioN, Recommendation Relating to Civil
Arrest, 11 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
STUDMS 11 (1972).
Civil Procedure; claim and delivery
Code of Civil Procedure Chapter 2 (commencing with §509) (re-
pealed); Chapter 2 (commencing with §511.010) (new).
AB 103 (Warren); STATS 1973, Ch 526
Support: California Law Revision Commission
Enacts permanent claim and delivery procedure initiated by
written application executed under oath and containing specified
information; requires notice and hearing before a writ of possession
may be issued except under specified conditions; specifies the in-
formation which must be contained in the writ of possession; allows
plaintiff to apply for a temporary restraining order pending the
hearing; provides for ex parte writ of possession in limited situa-
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lions; provides procedures for levying writs of possession by the
sheriff; specifies requirements and procedures for filing and except-
ing to undertakings; provides that a court commissioner may per-
form all functions required by this chapter; provisions of this act
are severable; act will not become operative until July 1, 1974.
Chapter 526 has been enacted to provide a permanent statutory
claim and delivery remedy in California, thus repealing Chapter 2
(commencing with §509) of the Code of Civil Procedure [CAL. STATS.
1972, c. 855, at 480] which constituted temporary claim and delivery
legislation terminating by its own terms on December 31, 1975. Chap-
ter 526 implements several changes in the claim and delivery procedure
enacted last year under which creditors could apply for and, after
appropriate hearing, obtain interim possession of personal property
pending final outcome of a lawsuit regarding that property.
Writ of Possession
To initiate the claim and delivery process, written application for
a writ of possession must be filed. Section 512.010 provides that
this application may be filed at the time of filing of the complaint
or at any time thereafter with the court in which the action is brought.
The application for writ of possession must be executed under oath
and must include all of the following: (1) a showing of the basis
of the plaintiffs claim and that the plaintiff is entitled to possession
of the property claimed (prior to Chapter 526, only ownership without
an independent showing of a right to possession needed to be claimed);
(2) a showing that the property is wrongfully detained by the defend-
ant, the manner in which the defendant came into possession of the
property, and the reason for the detention to the plaintiff's best knowl-
edge and belief; (3) a particular description of the property and a
statement of its value; (4) a statement of the location of the property
and, if the property or some part of it is within a private place
which may have to be entered to take possession, a showing that there
is probable cause to believe that such property is located there; and
(5) a statement that the property has not been taken for a tax, assess-
ment, or fine,, pursuant to a statute, or seized under an execution
against the property of the plaintiff or, if so seized, that it is by statute
exempt from such seizure.
Section 512.020 requires that, after the application has been filed,
a hearing on a notice motion must be held prior to issuance of the
writ of possession, except in those enumerated cases where an ex parte
writ may be issued. Section 512.030 requires that prior to the hearing
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the defendant must be served with (1) a copy of the summons and
complaint, (2) a "Notice of Application and Hearing," and (3) a
copy of the application and any affidavit in support thereof. Section
512.040 requires that the "Notice of Application and Hearing" inform
the defendant: (1) that a hearing will be held at a time and place
to be specified on the plaintiff's application for the writ of possession;
(2) that the court will issue the writ if it is found that the plaintiff's
claim is probably valid, but that the determination of actual validity
of the claim will be made at subsequent proceedings in the action
and will not be affected by the decision at the hearing; (3) that
the defendant may oppose the issuance of the writ of possession by
filing with the court an affidavit providing evidence sufficient to defeat
the plaintiff's right to issuance of the writ or by filing an undertaking
to stay the delivery of the property in accordance with Section
515.020; and (4) the notice shall contain a specified statement to
the effect that the defendant should consult an attorney to assist at
the hearing if he believes that the plaintiff is not entitled to possession
of the claimed property.
Section 512.050 requires that each party shall file with the court
and serve upon the other party any affidavits and points and authori-
ties intended to be relied upon at the hearing. At the hearing, the
court shall make its determinations upon the basis of the pleadings
and other papers in the record; but if good cause is shown, the court
may consider additional evidence produced at the hearing or may con-
tinue the hearing so that additional evidence may be produced.
Section 512.060 provides that the writ of possession shall issue at
the hearing if the probable, validity (defined in §511.090) of the
plaintiff's claim is established and the plaintiff has provided an under-
taking as required by Section 515.010 (infra). No writ may be issued
directing the levying officer to enter a private place to take posses-
sion of any property unless probable cause has been established by
the plaintiff that the property is located there. Once the writ of posses-
sion is issued it must meet all of the following requirements provided
in Section 512.080: (1) be directed to the levying officer within whose
jurisdiction the property is located; (2) describe the specific property
to be seized; (3) specify any private place that may be entered to
take possession of the property or some part of it; (4) direct the
levying officer to levy on the property and to retain it in his custody
until released or sold; and (5) inform the defendant that he has the
right to except to the sureties upon the plaintiff's undertaking, a copy
of which shall be attached to the writ, or to obtain redelivery of the
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property by filing an undertaking as prescribed by Section 515.020
(infra).
Section 512.070 provides that if the writ is issued, the court may
also order the defendant to transfer possession to the plaintiff, and
such order shall contain notice to the defendant that he may be subject
to contempt of court or arrest if he does not comply. Sections 512.100
and 512.110 provide that at trial neither the court's final determination
nor the parties' rights shall be affected by the determinations of the
court at the hearing on issuance of the writ of possession; nor shall
the determinations of the court be used in evidence in the trial. In
addition, Section 512.20 now requires that if the plaintiff fails to re-
cover judgment in the action, he shall redeliver the property to the
defendant and be liable for all damages sustained by the defendant
which are proximately caused by operation of either a temporary re-
straining order and preliminary injunction (if any), the writ of posses-
sion, the loss of possession of the property, and any penalties levied
from prior failures to turn over the property.
Temporary Restraining Order
Section 513.010 provides the plaintiff additional protection for his
property in the period after he has applied for a writ of possession,
and during the time the hearing is pending, by authorizing the plaintiff
to apply for a temporary restraining order by setting forth in the appli-
cation a statement of grounds justifying the issuance of such order.
Section 513.020 provides that in the discretion of the court, the tempo-
rary restraining order may prohibit the defendant from doing any or
all of the following: (1) transferring any interest in the property
by sale, pledge, or grant of security interest, or otherwise disposing
of, or encumbering the property; but if the property is farm products
held for sale or lease or is inventory, the order may not prohibit the
defendant from transferring the property in the ordinary course of
business, although it may impose approriate restrictions on the disposi-
tion of the proceeds from such transfer; (2) concealing or otherwise
removing the property in such a manner as to make it less available
to seizure by the levy officer; and (3) impairing the value of the
property either by acts of destruction or by failure to care for
the property in a reasonable manner.
Section 513.010 provides that a temporary restraining order may
be issued ex parte if the plaintiff has established the probable validity
of the claim, has provided an undertaking, and has established the prob-
ability that there is an immediate danger that the property claimed
Selected 1973 California Legislation
Civil Procedure
may become unavailable to levy by reason of being transferred, con-
cealed, or removed or may become substantially impaired in value.
The section further provides that the court shall dissolve any temporary
restraining order if at the hearing on issuance of the writ of possession
the court determines that the plaintiff is not entitled to a writ of posses-
sion; otherwise, the court may issue a preliminary injunction to remain
in effect until the property claimed is seized pursuant to the writ of
possession.
Ex Parte Writ of Possession
Section 512.020(b) provides that a writ of possession may be is-
sued ex parte if probable cause appears that any of the following
conditions exist: (1) where defendant gained possession by feloni-
ously taking the property from plaintiff, but not including taking by
embezzlement or false pretenses; (2) where the property is a credit
card; or (3) where the defendant acquired possession of the property
in the ordinary course of his trade or business for commercial pur-
poses, and the following three tests are satisfied: (a) the property
is not necessary for the support of the defendant or his family; (b)
there is an immediate danger that the property will become unavailable
to levy by reason of being transferred, concealed, or removed from
the state, or will become substantially impaired in value by acts of
destruction or failure to take care of the property in a reasonable
mainer; and (c) the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession is
necessary to protect the property. An ex parte writ of possession
must be accompanied by: (1) a copy of the summons and complaint;
(2) a copy of the application and any supporting affidavits; (3) notice
to defendant that if he believes plaintiff may not be entitled to posses-
sion of the property claimed, he may wish to promptly seek the advice
of an attorney; and (4) notice informing defendant of his rights under
this subdivision. Section 512.020 also provides that the defendant
may make application to have the ex parte writ quashed, and have
any property levied on pursuant to the writ released. Such applica-
tion is to be made by a noticed motion and hearing set. Pending
that hearing on defendant's application, the court may order that deliv-
ery of property previously levied on be stayed. If the court determines
that plaintiff is not entitled to a writ of possession, the court shall
quash the writ and order the release and redelivery of any property
previously levied upon. The court shall also award the defendant
any damages sustained by him which were proximately caused by the
application of the writ of possession.
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Undertakings
Section 515.010 provides that the court shall not issue a temporary
restraining order or a writ of possession until the plaintiff has filed
a written undertaking. The undertaking shall provide that the sureties
are bound to the defendant in the amount of the undertaking for
the return of the property to the defendant, if return is ordered, and
for the payment of any sum the defendant may recover against plain-
tiff. There must be two or more sureties in an amount not less than
twice the value of the property as determined by the court.
Section 515.030(a) provides that the defendant may except to
the plaintiffs sureties not later than ten days after levy of the writ
of possession by filing with the court in which the action was brought
a notice of exception to sureties and mailing a copy of the notice
to the levying officer and to the plaintiff. An affidavit stating that
such copies have been mailed shall be filed with the court at the time
the notice is filed. If the defendant does not except to the plaintiff's
sureties as provided in this section, he waives all objection to them.
This section also states that sureties shall justify in the manner pro-
vided in Chapter 7 (commencing with §830) of the Code of Civil
Procedure before the court in which the action was brought at a time
specified by the excepting party. If the plaintiffs sureties fail to
justify at the time and place appointed or do not qualify, the court
shall vacate the temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction,
if any, and the writ of possession and, if levy has occurred, order
the levying officer or the plaintiff to return the property to the defend-
ant. If the plaintiff's sureties do qualify, the court shall order the
levying officer to deliver the property to the plaintiff.
Section 515.020 also establishes that the defendant may prevent
the plaintiff from taking possession of property pursuant to a writ
of possession, or regain possession of property so taken, by filing with
the court in which the action was brought a written undertaking exe-
cuted by two or more sufficient sureties in an amount equal to the
amount of plaintiffs undertaking or, if there has been no judicial deter-
mination of the value of the property, then in an amount equal to
the value of the property stated in the plaintiff's application for the
writ of possession. The undertaking shall state that if the defendant
loses in the original action, he shall pay all costs awarded to the plaintiff
and all plaintiffs damages which are proximately caused by the plain-
tiff's failure to gain or retain possession, not exceeding the amount
of the undertaking. It shall also state the address to which a copy
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of the notice of exception to sureties may be sent. The defendant's
undertaking may be filed at any time before or after levy of the writ
of possession. A copy of the undertaking shall be mailed to the levy-
ig officer and to the plaintiff. An affidavit stating that such copies
have been mailed shall be filed with the court at the time the undertak-
ingis filed.
As provided by Section 515.030(b), the plaintiff may except to
the defendant's sureties not later than ten days after the defendant's
undertaking is filed by filing with the court in which the action was
brought a notice of exception to sureties and mailing a copy of the
notice to the levying officer and to the defendant at the address set
out in his undertaking. An affidavit stating that such copies have
been mailed shall be filed with the court at the time the notice is
filed. If the plaintiff does not except to the sureties of the defendant
as provided in this section, he waives all objection to them. If the
defendant's sureties fail to justify or do not qualify, the court shall
order the levying officer to deliver the property to the plaintiff, or
if the plaintiff has previously been given possession of the property,
he shall retain such possession. If the defendant's sureties do qualify,
the court shall order the levying officer or the plaintiff to deliver the
property to the defendant. Also, as provided by Section 515.020(d),
if an undertaking for redelivery is filed and defendant's sureties are
not excepted to, the levying officer shall deliver the property to the
defendant, or if the plaintiff has previously been given possession of
the property, the plaintiff shall deliver such property to the defendant.
Levy and Custody
Section 514.010 provides that, upon receipt of the writ of possession,
the levying officer shall search for and take custody of the specified
property by removing it to a place of safekeeping by installing a
keeper. If the specified property is used as a dwelling, such as a
mobilehome or boat, levy shall be made by placing a keeper in charge
of the property for two days, at the plaintiffs expense, after which
period the levying officer shall remove the occupants and any contents
not specified in the writ and shall take exclusive possession of the
property. If the specified property or any part of it is in a private
place, the levying officer shall at the time he demands possession of
the property announce his identity, purpose, and authority. If the
property is not voluntarily delivered, he may break into the enclosure
or building where the property may be located in such a way as to
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cause the least damage and may call upon the power of the county
to help him. If the levying officer reasonably believes the entry and
seizure of the property will involve substantial risk of death or serious
bodily harm to any person, he shall refrain from seizing the property
and shall promptly make a return to the court setting forth the reasons
for his belief that the risk exists. The court shall then make such
orders as may be appropriate. Nothing in this section authorizes the
levying officer to enter or search any private place not specified in
the writ of possession or other order of the court; but pursuant to
Section 512.090, the plaintiff may apply ex parte in writing to the
court in which the action was brought for an endorsement on the
writ directing the levying officer to seize the property at a private
place not specified in the writ. The court shall make the endorsement
if the plaintiff establishes by affidavit that there is probable cause
to believe that the property or some part of it may be found at
that place.
Section 514.020 requires that at the time of levy, the levying officer
shall deliver to the person in possession of the property a copy of
the writ of possession with a copy of the plaintiff's undertaking at-
tached. If no one is in possession of the property at the time of
levy, the writ and attached undertaking shall be subsequently served
on the defendant as provided by either Section 1010 or 415.10 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
After the levying officer takes possession pursuant to a writ of pos-
session, he shall keep the property in a secure place. Section 514.030
provides that if notice of a filing of an undertaking for redelivery
or notice of exception to the plaintiff's sureties is not received by the
levying officer within ten days after levy of the writ of possession,
the levying officer shall deliver the property to the plaintiff upon re-
ceiving his fees and expenses for taking and keeping the property.
If notice of the filing of an undertaking for redelivery is received
by the levying officer within the ten-day limit and defendant's sureties
are not excepted to, the levying officer shall redeliver the property
to defendant upon expiration of the time to so except and after receiv-
ing necessary fees and expenses not already paid or advanced by plain-
tiff. If notice of exception to the plaintiff's sureties or notice of the
filing of an undertaking for redelivery is received within ten days after
levy of the writ of possession and defendant's sureties are excepted
to, the levying officer shall not deliver or redeliver the property until
the procedures for review of such exception, as defined in Section
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515.030, are complete. Section 514.030 also provides that where not
otherwise provided by contract and where an undertaking for redeliv-
ery has not been filed, and upon a showing that the property is per-
ishable or will greatly deteriorate or depreciate in value or for some
other reason that the interests of the parties will be best served
thereby, the court may order that the property be sold and the proceeds
deposited in the court to abide the judgment in the action.
Section 514.040 requires the levying officer to return the writ of
possession, with his proceedings thereon, to the court in which the
action is pending within 30 days after levy but in no event more
than 60 days after the writ is issued. Section 514.050 provides that
where the property taken is claimed by one other than the defendant
or his agent, the rules and proceedings applicable in cases of third-
party claims after levy under execution shall apply.
Miscellaneous
Section 516.030 specifies that the facts stated in each affidavit filed
pursuant to this chapter shall be set forth with particularity. Except
where matters are specifically permitted by this chapter to be shown
by information and belief, each affidavit shall show affirmatively that
the affiant, if sworn as a witness, can testify competently to the facts
stated therein. The affiant may be any person, whether or not a
party to the action, who has knowledge of the facts. A verified com-
plaint that satisfies the requirements of this section may be used in
lieu of or in addition to an ordinary affidavit.
Section 516.040 has been enacted to explicitly provide that the ju-
dicial duties to be performed under Chapter 2 (commencing with
§511.010) of the Code of Civil Procedure are "subordinate judicial
duties" within the meaning of Article VI, Section 22 of the California
Constitution and may be performed by appointed officers such as court
commissioners. Section 516.050 specifies that nothing in Chapter 526
shall preclude the granting of injunctive relief pursuant to Chapter
3 (commencing with §525) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sections
511.010 through 511.100 define significant words and phrases used
throughout this chapter, e.g., complaint, farm products, inventory, and
probable validity.
The legislature has declared that if any provision of this act or
the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid,
such invalidity shall not affect any other provision or application of
this act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or
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application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable
[A.B. 103, CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 526, §2]. The legislature has also
declared that this act will not become operative until July 1, 1974
[A.B. 103, CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 526, §3].
COMMENT
Chapter 526 is the second California legislative response to Blair
v. Pitchess [5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42
(1971)] which held the then existing statutory procedure for claim
and delivery unconstitutional on the grounds that (1) it violated proce-
dural due process by allowing a taking of property without prior notice
or opportunity to be heard, and (2) the official intrusions authorized
were unreasonable searches and seizures unless made with probable
cause (referring to probable cause to believe both that the plaintiff's
claim to the property is valid and that the property to be seized was
in a certain place). The first response to Blair was last year's bill
[A.B. 1623, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 855, §3] which attempted to remedy
the above constitutional infirmities. It constituted a substantive revi-
sion of California's claim and delivery law, but was only interim legis-
lation. This year's bill has enacted several more significant changes
and now becomes a permanent part of the statutes.
One change was instituted in, the hearing procedures., Prior to
Chapter 526, the plaintiff was required to first submit his application
for writ of possession along with supporting material at which time
the court reviewed them. If the application met the specified require-
ments, the court issued an order directed to the defendant to -show
cause why the property should not be transferred to the plaintiff. The
order fixed the place and time of the hearing which was to be no
sooner than ten days from the issuance of the order. The order in-
formed the defendant that he could file affidavits and appear in person
to oppose the issuance of the writ of possession and informed him
that he could file an undertaking with the court to stay the delivery.
Chapter 526 has established a single hearing procedure where the
plaintiff simply files the complaint and then the application with the
court of record, gives notice to the defendant [the defendant is served
with: (1) a copy of the summons and complaint; (2) a notice of
application and hearing (Section 512.040); and (3) a copy of the
application and any supporting affidavit(s)], and makes his motion
for the writ of possession at the subsequent hearing. It is significant
to note that prior to Chapter 526 the defendant was served with
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neither a copy of the complaint, a copy of the application, nor any
supporting affidavit(s). Also, the defendant is now informed in the
Notice of Application and Hearing that the writ of possession will
be issued if the plaintiff's claim is probably valid and the other require-
ments for issuing the writ are established. The defendant is informed
that the actual validity of the claim will not be decided until subse-
quent proceedings in the action occur (judgment is reached) and that
the issuance of the writ will have no bearing on the subsequent judg-
ment The defendant is additionally informed in the Notice of Appli-
cation and Hearing that if he believes that he should have possession
of the property and he intends to defend against the plaintiff's claim,
he should promptly consult an attorney.
Another major change is the limiting of ex parte writs of possession
even further than was the case in last year's bill. The ex parte writ
has been limited to cases involving credit cards, property that has
been feloniously taken, excluding property taken by false pretenses
and embezzlement, and property acquired by defendant in the ordinary
course of his trade or business for commercial purposes where the
following factors are present: (1) the property is not necessary for
the support of defendant or his property; (2) there is immediate
danger the property will become unavailable or substantially impaired;
and (3) the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession is necessary
to protect the property.
California's claim and delivery statute is still suspect of violating
constitutional guarantees of procedural due process (fourteenth
amendment). The key sequence of cases bearing on this point are:
(1) Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation [395 U.S. 337 (1969)],
a wage garnishment case which held a Wisconsin statute unconstitu-
tional because it authorized a taking of property without procedural
due process; (2) Blair v. Pitchess [5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242,
96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971)], which declared California's previous claim
and delivery statute unconstitutional by relying strongly on Sniadach
but saying that there might be extraordinary exceptions which, if nar-
rowly drawn in the statute, would justify an ex parte writ; (3) Ran-
done v. Appellate Department [5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709 (1971)], wherein California's attachment statutes were
struck, again strongly relying upon Sniadach, and adding the concept
that any ex parte procedure which deprived a person of the necessities
of life would be invalid regardless of how extraordinary the situation;
and (4) Fuentes v. Shevin [407 U.S. 67 (1972)], in which the
Court declared replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania unconsti-
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tutional on the basis of depriving a person of property without a hear-
ing (due process), and stated that although there may be extraordinary
situations which justify an exception, they must be "truly unusual."
Fuentes spelled out three criteria which have been present in those
few cases to date where the Court allowed outright seizure without
a hearing: (1) where the seizure was directly necessary to secure
an important governmental or general public interest; (2) where there
has been a special need for prompt action; and (3) where the person
initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for
determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that
it was necessary and justified in the particular instance (i.e., the state
has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force). In
dicta the Fuentes Court did, however, refuse to consider any distinc-
tions based on "necessities of life" since the root principle of proce-
dural due process applies to property generally [See 407 U.S. at 89].
Thus the three exception areas of the new statute allowing ex parte
writs of possession will have to be constitutionally measured against
both the California court's Randone decision and the three test criteria
of Fuentes. With regard to the former, situations in which allegedly
stolen goods or a credit card are "necessities" are difficult to imagine,
but at least possible. For example, if a legitimate controversy existed
as to whether an indigent had really stolen food, a car, or a refriger-
ator, a court could, without any hearing, issue a writ of possession
and thus arguably come in direct conflict with Randone. The Fuentes'
tests would possibly allow the new statute's stolen goods exception,
but should raise serious question as to whether credit cards can
be excepted from the Court's "rule" that ex parte writs violate due
process. Hence, both Randone and Fuentes may be a basis for attack
on the new statute in certain fact situations. The third ex parte
exception in the new statute, possession of property acquired for "com-
mercial" purposes, has not really been considered in the cases thus
far. The wording of Section 512.20(b) (2) appears aimed at giving
some protection to the rights of the individual who owns his own
small business via a "necessities of life!' provision, and it also tries
to meet the Fuentes requirement of a need for prompt action; but
the totality of the three criteria given in Fuentes, as well as its overall
emphasis on the due process protection of property rights in general,
makes this section of the new statute appear quite vulnerable. That
is, there would seem to be no appropriate reason why the taking of
"commercial" property would not be just as much a violation of due
process as the equivalent taking of non-commercial property.
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Another change has been the declaration in Section 516.040 that
the judicial duties to be performed under Chapter 526 are subordinate
judicial duties within the meaning of Article VI, Section 22 of the
California Constitution and may be performed by appointed officers
such as court commissioners [See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §259
(powers and duties of court commissioners)]. This power is consis-
tent with the "in chambers" duties delegable by the court [See CAL.
CONST. art. VI, §§ 14, 22] and is also consistent with procedures pres-
ently used in having commissioners issue search warrants in many
California districts as well as the federal court system [See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 41(a)]. It will accomplish a welcome shift in the work-
load in judicial districts like Los Angeles which use a large number
of commissioners to help the courts with the administrative workload.
Naturally, the commissioner, as an officer of the court, must establish
probable cause for issuance of the writ in each case so as not to
violate fourth amendment search and seizure rights; but adherence
to the procedures detailed in the new act should adequately prevent
the issuance of writs from slipping back into the purely clerical func-
tion which was a factor in having the prior statute declared unconstitu-
tional under Blair.
In conclusion, it would appear that Chapter 526 is a good sequel
to A.B. 1623 [CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 855], in that it is generally re-
sponsive to the guidelines established by Blair for constitutional claim
and delivery legislation. What remains to be seen is how the con-
tinued implementation of ex parte writs of possession in limited situa-
tions in claim and delivery proceedings will fare. The possibility of
court tests on whether or not the new statute's rules for granting ex
parte writs is sufficiently narrow and sufficiently protective of individ-
ual property rights as spelled out in Randone and Fuentes would seem
more than likely at some future time. Fortunately, the legislature
provided that the sections of the act are severable in the event of
any adverse court ruling; so the worst case result would likely be
that the sections of the new code which allow issuance of an ex parte
writ of possession would simply be invalidated.
See Generally:
1) 2 Wri'ni, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Provisional Remedies §§24-38 (2d ed. 1971);
§24A (Supp. 1972).
2) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALwOmA DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICE
§§10.01-10.35 (1968); §§10.01, 10.10 (Supp. 1972).
3) 4 PAc. L.J., RVIE OF SELECTED 1972 CALIFORNIA LEGIsLATION 281 (1973).
4) Recommendation Relating to Claim and Delivery, 11 CAL. LAw REvISIoN COMM'N,
REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STrDius 301 (1972).
5) Jackson, Attachment In California--.iWhat Now?, 3 PAc. L.J. 1 (1972).
6) Comment, Attachment in California: Senate Bill 1048, the Interim Response
to Randone, 4 PAc. LJ. 146 (1973).
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Civil Procedure; court costs in
municipal or justice courts
Code of Civil Procedure § 1031 (amended).
AB 1592 (Cullen); STATs 1973, Ch 818
Support: California Association of Collectors
Section 1031 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifies when a pre-
vailing party in a municipal or justice court action may recover his
costs and necessary disbursements. Prior to the enactment of Chapter
818, Section 1031 provided that if the prevailing party recovered less
than the jurisdictional amount of thel small claims court, the court
had the discretion to allow or deny costs, or to allow costs in part
as it deemed proper. Chapter 818 has amended Section 1031 to pro-
vide that the court may now exercise such discretion only if the action
could have been brought in the small claims court and the prevailing
party is either the plaintiff or cross-complainant. The defendant
against whom the action is dismissed may always recover his costs
and necessary disbursements. If the action could not have been
brought in small claims court, the prevailing plaintiff or cross-com-
plainant shall recover the actual costs of filing and service of process
only if the court is satisfied that prior to commencing the action he
notified the defendant in writing that he intended to commence action
and that it could result in a judgment against the defendant which
would include costs and necessary disbursements.
Prior to enactment of Chapter 818, Section 1031 also required the
court, in specified actions for the recovery of wages, to add as part
of the costs in any judgment recovered by the plaintiff an attorney's
fee not exceeding twenty percent of the amount recovered. Chapter
818 has amended Section 1031 to apply this provision to a prevailing
cross-complainant as well as to a prevailing plaintiff.
See Generally:
1) 1 Wrrxs, CALrFoRNA PROCEDURE, Courts §§187-205 (2d ed. 1970).
2) CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §117 et seq. (small claims court regulations).
Civil Procedure; default judgments-attorneys' fees
Code of Civil Procedure §585 (amended).
SB 932 (Holmdahl); STATS 1973, Ch 312
Support: State Bar of California; California Judicial Council
Section 585(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that in
an action arising upon contract or upon a judgment of a court of
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this state for the recovery of money or damages only, the clerk may
enter a default judgment against the defendant if such defendant has
been served a summons and has not responded. The clerk may in-
clude an attorney's fee in the default judgment if the contract upon
which the action is brought provides that a fee be allowed and if
the court has adopted a schedule of attorneys' fees. Section 585(1)
has been amended to also allow the clerk to include an attorney's
fee in the default judgment if the action is one in which the plaintiff
is entitled by statute to recover an attorney's fee in addition to money
or damages, and the court has adopted a schedule of attorneys' fees.
COMMENT
Where actions are based on certain statutes such as the Unruh Act
[CAL. Civ. CODE §1801 et seq.], the prevailing party may be entitled
to recover a reasonable attorney's fee by virtue of provisions in these
statutes which allow for such recovery. Some courts have permitted
the clerk in actions based on these statutes to include such a fee
when there is a default judgment and a schedule of attorneys' fees
has been adopted [See STATE BAR OF CALFoRNmIA, 1972 CONFER-
ENCE RESOLUTION 9-10]; but prior to this chapter the authority for
such practice was questionable.
See Generally:
1) 4 WmaN, CALwomuar ?RocDrmn, Proceedings Without Trial §§140-142 (2d ed.
1971).
Civil Procedure; judgments-recordation
Code of Civil Procedure §668 (amended); Government Code
§72050.7 (new).
SB 146 (Nejedly); STATs 1973, Ch 185
Support: Association of Municipal Court Clerks of California
Section 668 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been amended to
delete the requirement that the clerk of a municipal court enter civiljudgments in a minute book, and now provides that the clerk must
instead keep a judgment book in which judgments are entered. This
conforms to the requirement that superior courts maintain a judgment
book (§668).
Chapter 185 has also added Government Code Section 72050.7
to eliminate the requirement that a clerk of a municipal court keep
a minute book in those counties where it is required by court order
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or rule that individual civil minute orders be placed in the court's
file of actions. The requirement, however, that the clerk keep minutes
is retained. Section 72050.7 does not eliminate the requirement for
a judgment book where civil judgments and decrees are required to
be entered.
COMMENT t
The amendment to Section 668 of the Code of Civil Procedure
and the addition of Section 72050.7 of the Government Code provide
uniformity in record-keeping activities in superior and municipal
courts. Municipal courts will no longer be required to maintain sepa-
rate minute books, but rather will be permitted to file minutes chrono-
logically in the case folders and enter judgments in the judgment
books. This practice, followed by the superior courts, will decrease
the accumulation of needless records in municipal courts.
See Generally:
1) 4 WrrmN, CALIFoRNu PwOcEwUE, Judgment §§52, 53, 56, 57 (2d ed. 1971).
Civil Procedure; pleading causes of action
Code of Civil Procedure §425.20 (repealed); §430.10 (amended).
AB 1683 (McAlister); STATS 1973, Ch 828
Chapter 828 has repealed Section 425.20 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, which required causes of action to be separately stated. The
repeal of this section allows causes of action to be either stated sepa-
rately or stated together as is allowed in federal courts [FED. R. Civ.
P. 10(b)]. Chapter 828 has also amended Section 430.10 to pro-
vide that failure to separately state causes of action will not constitute
grounds for demurrer to a complaint or cross-complaint Existing
case law, however, would allow a demurrer on the grounds of uncer-
tainty and unintelligibility when causes have not been separately stated
and the facts are complex and more clarity is needed [See Craig v.
Los Angeles, 44 Cal. App. 2d 71, 111 P.2d 977 (1941)].
COMMENT
The change in the statutes, eliminating the requirement of separate
pleadings, has been justified on grounds of simplification. The new
procedure should save the lawyer's preparation time, and should also
reduce time and effort in all phases of litigating claims with multiple
causes of action. Proponents of this approach point to California's
past working experience in being able to join causes of action for
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injury to person and to property arising out of the same tort as indica-
tive of the savings of paperwork, time, and energy possible when
it is not mandatory to separately state each cause of action. Fur-
ther, since defense attorneys may have been tempted to use the lack
of separately stated causes as an excuse to delay or stall final proceed-
ings, the new enactment should help speed up the progress of litigation
[See Assemblyman Alister McAlister, Press Release, Apr. 25, 1973].
Those who have been critical of the bill point to the fact that the
present system of separate statements is not only working well, but
has the advantage of sharply presenting the issues for demurrer and
any orders or motion for partial summary judgment [Interview with
Harold Bradford, Legislative Representative, State Bar of California,
Sacramento, Calif., Sept. 24, 1973]. Accordingly, the practicing at-
torney may still want to list his causes of action separately in several
important situations: (1) where statutes of limitation are different
for different causes of action; (2) where the facts of the case are
complex, and either the court or the opposing party would find a
"lumped" cause of action approach ambiguous or unintelligible; or
(3) where initially it is not clear what theory of liability he wants
to pursue most vigorously. Since most attorneys have developed tech-
niques for fully organizing the facts in the first cause of action, and
then incorporating them by reference in subsequent causes, none of
the above "problem" areas will represent any serious change in their
present approach. Naturally, the attorney whose work is something
less than well organized, and who now tries to group several causes
of action into one pleading, may find himself faced with an opposing
demurrer on grounds of uncertainty. It remains to be seen whether
this change in the statutes also represents a first step toward adoption
by California of the comparatively loose and informal federal "notice
pleading" procedures.
See Generally:
1) 5 WRwir & MILLnR, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Pleadings-Motions
§§1322, 1324 (1969).
2) 39 CAL. JtR. 2d, Pleading §144 (1952).
Civil Procedure; service of process by mail
Code of Civil Procedure § 1013a (amended).
SB 85 (Grunsky); STATS 1973, Ch 302
Support: State Bar of California
Chapter 302 has amended Section 1013a of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure to require that pleadings, notices, and other documents served
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by mail bear a notation of the date and place of mailing, or be
accompanied by an unsigned copy of either an affidavit or a certificate
of mailing which must show among other things the date and place
of the mailing. Although service of pleadings, notices, and other doc-
uments by mail is complete at the time of deposit in the mail [CAL.
CODE Civ. PRoC. §1013], Section 1013a, prior to amendment, in-
cluded no provision specifically requiring that the party served by mail
be informed of the effective date of mailing. Thus, often the party
served by mail could not determine the effective date of mailing and
time in which to respond unless he either examined the envelope for
postmark or contacted the court clerk to have the original on file
examined.
See Generally:
1) 4 WiToN, CALFORNIA PROCEDuRE, Proceedings Without Trial §20 (2d ed. 1971).
2) 4 PAC. L.J., REVIEw OF SELECTED 1972 CALnFORNIA LEGISLATION 305 (1973).
3) STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1971 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 12-13.
Civil Procedure; summary judgments
Code of Civil Procedure §437c (repealed); §437c (new).
SB 651 (Bradley); STATS 1973, Ch 366
Support: State Bar of California; Credit Managers' Association;
California State Legislative Committee
Requires a motion for summary judgment be granted if there is
no triable issue of a material fact; expands permissible supporting
material for a summary judgment motion; allows a summary judg-
ment action to be made starting 60 days after the general appearance
of the other party; provides for partial summary judgment by issues
as well as parties; provides that expenses of defending party can be
assessed on the moving party if a motion for summary judgment is
brought as a sham; provides for mandatory denial or postponement
of a motion for summary judgment when defending party, for
good cause, is unable to answer immediately; requires equal evi-
dentiary quality in both supporting and opposing affidavits.
Chapter 366 has repealed Section 437c of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure relating to summary judgments and has added a new Section
437c broadening the use of summary judgments and significantly
changing the standards under which summary judgments may be
granted. Previously, a motion for summary judgment could only be
granted in superior or municipal courts. Chapter 366 has now ex-
tended the use of summary judgment procedures to any civil action
or proceeding.!,
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Former Section 437c only expressly provided for the use of affi-
davits in support of a summary judgment motion. As added, Section
437c permits the motion to be supported by affidavits, declarations,
admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of
which judicial notice shall or may be taken. This codifies existing
case law [See Newport v. Los Angeles, 184 Cal. App. 2d 229, 7
Cal. Rptr. 497 (1960) (answers to interrogatories); Bennett v. Hi-
bernia Bank, 186 Cal. App. 2d 748, 9 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1960) (admis-
sions); Thomson v. Honer, 179 Cal. App. 2d 197, 3 Cal. Rptr. 791
(1960) (papers and pleadings on file in the same or another action)].
The supporting and opposing material is still required to be made
on the basis of personal knowledge and must show that the affiant
is competent to testify in court to matters stated therein. However,
instead of only requiring detailed facts, both the supporting and oppos-
ing material set forth must now be admissible evidence.
A motion for summary judgment may be made any time after 60
days have elapsed from the general appearance in the action or
proceeding of each party against whom the motion is directed. This
requirement changes the existing case law in California which did not
permit a plaintiff to move for summary judgment before a non-de-
faulting defendant's answer was on file [See Orange County Air Pollu-
tion Control Dist. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 3d 109, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 410 (1972)]. A party moving for summary judgment is still
required to serve notice of the motion and supporting papers at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. Also, the filing of
the motion shall not extend the time within which a party must other-
wise file a responsive pleading.
Prior to the new section, a judgment could be entered in the discre-
tion of the court if the affidavits showed there was no triable issue
of fact. As amended, Section 437c now makes issuance of summary
judgment mandatory if there is no triable issue as to any material
fact. This elimination of the court's discretion in effect codifies exist-
ing case law which had abrogated any real discretion the court had
in granting the motion [See Whitney's at the Beach v. Superior Court,
3 Cal. App. 3d 258, 83 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1970) (preemptory writ
of mandate ordering dismissal of complaint issued where the moving
party's affidavits were sufficient and summary judgment was not
granted)]. In determining whether there is a triable issue as to any
material fact, the court is to consider all admissible evidence set
forth in the submitted papers and all inferences reasonably deducible
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from such evidence, except the court shall not grant summary judg-
ment based on inferences which are contradicted by other evidence
or inferences. Section 437c further provides that if a party is otherwise
entitled to a summary judgment, the court may not deny the motion
on the grounds of credibility or for want of cross examination of wit-
nesses furnishing affidavits or declarations in support of the summary
judgment, except where in the discretion of the judge: (1) the only
proof of a material fact offered in support of the summary judgment
is an affidavit or declaration made by an individual who was the sole
witness to such fact; or (2) a material fact is an individual's state
of mind, or lack thereof, and such fact is sought to be established
solely by the individual's affirmation thereof.
A partial summary judgment is still possible. Previously, a partial
judgment could be granted where affidavits proved that a good cause
of action did not exist as to some part of a plaintiff's total claims;
and the cause of action was severed accordingly. As amended, Sec-
tion 437c requires that if it appears the proof supports the granting
of a summary judgment motion as to some but not all the issues in-
volved in the action, or if one or more of the issues raised by the
claim is admitted, or if one or more of the issues raised by the de-
fense is conceded, then the court shall specify that such issues are
without substantial controversy. As to each individual issue, the stand-
ard has also been changed to require a triable issue as to any material
fact. Previously, the section stated that no judgment shall be entered
prior to the termination of such action. The new section states that
where a separate judgment may properly be awarded in the action,
the judge may do so. Otherwise, as before, the interim order is to
be carried over and entered with the final judgment at the conclusion
of the proceedings. The amended statute thus allows the judge to
grant a partial summary judgment with respect to causes of action
or parties prior to the start of trial, or hold such order (as would
be done with issues found to be without controversy) over to the
end.
Chapter 366 also provides that the court shall deny the motion,
or order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery
to be had, if it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition
that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for rea-
sons stated, then be presented.
Additionally, if the court determines at any time that any of the
affidavits are presented in bad faith or solely for purposes of delay,
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the court shall order the party presenting such affidavits to pay the
other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing
of the affidavits caused the other party.
Section 437c still provides that summary judgment entered under
this section is an appealable judgment.
COMMENT
The primary duty of the court in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment is not to decide issues of fact, but to determine whether
there are issues of fact to be tried [See Walsh v. Walsh, 18 Cal. 2d
439, 116 P.2d 62 (1941)]. This concept makes the summary judg-
ment a powerful tool in the hands of attorneys and judges to reduce
needless litigation and speed the machinery of justice. It also makes
it a drastic remedy, in that it not only limits the judge's opportunity
to see the facts "come alive" in direct testimony and cross-examination,
but also cuts short the plaintiffs day in court. Despite the problem
of swollen court calendars and long judicial delays, trial judges appear
to have made relatively sparing use of summary judgment to help
weed out needless litigation. Their generally conservative approach
has not only been based on a desire to be especially careful of both
parties' rights, but has also stemmed from the confusion associated
with the wording of the earlier versions of Section 437c. For ex-
ample, of 319 reported appellate decisions from 1933 to 1972 review-
ing full summary judgment grants, 44 percent were reversed on
appeal [Zack, California Summary Judgment: The Need for Legisla-
tive Reform, 59 CAL. L. REV. 439, 472 (1971), hereinafter cited
as Zack]. A reversal ratio of this size has likely tended to make trial
judges cautious in their granting of summary judgment. The amended
version of Section 437c, by clarifying and expanding the rules for
applying summary judgment, should improve the frequency of its use
and lessen the probability of reversals. Hopefully, it is thus a major
step forward in streamlining the flow of cases through our courts.
The new section makes nine changes in the existing law, some of
which codify existing case law, and others of which are completely
new. Roughly in the order in which they appear in the bill, these
issues are:
First, summary judgment can now be used in all civil actions, rather
than only those in municipal and superior courts. Practically, this
may not be as sweeping a change as indicated by the wording, since
summary judgment is not likely to be a generally used tool below
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the municipal or superior court level. Second, by officially removing
the discretionary element in the judge's decision, the new law strength-
ens the position of the party seeking a summary judgment, provided
his affidavits are conclusive compared to the opposition's. However,
the legislature's intent notwithstanding, "discretion" may have been
cut from the wording of the statute only to have crept in through
the back door in other areas. For example, the judge still decides
what is "material"; he also can consider "inferences" from a wide
variety of legal documents; and he has discretion in accepting or reject-
ing "sole witness" affidavits. The cautious judge, it would appear,
still has a great deal of room to maneuver in denying summary judg-
ment motions.
Third, the wording of the previous statute was vague as to when
the motion could be made and granted, and the new version clarifies
this area by setting a definite 60-day time period after which the sum-
mary judgment motion can be filed and action taken. Fourth, the
statute now allows for the use of almost any judicially acceptable sup-
porting materials in addition to the customary affidavits. Further,
the trial judge can consider the inferences reasonably deducible from
such evidence, thus considerably widening the scope of what an attor-
ney can bring either as movant or in defense of a summary judgment
motion. Although "inferences" which are contradicted by other infer-
ences or evidence shall not be the basis of granting the motion, a
serious question arises as to whether this provision will really result
in trial judges being able to dispose of issues or causes more quickly;
or whether it will simply raise more and varied questions as to whether
a triable issue of material fact is present, encouraging the judge to
pass the issue on to a jury trial. Fifth, with the exception of the
"sole witness" and the affiant who is describing his own state of mind,
the judge no longer has discretion to challenge an affidavit on the
basis of credibility. This provision flows naturally from the new re-
quirement that all supporting and opposing material be of admissible
quality. This section would appear to be an important clarification
of the "ground rules" under which a judge must now operate.
Sixth, the change in the law requiring admissible evidence of both
parties is probably the most significant of all, if the wording of the
new statute is interpreted literally by the courts. A respectable line
of California cases now holds to the so-called "popular conclusions"
doctrine, which states that a movant's affidavits will be considered
strictly and the defending affidavits will be construed liberally [See
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Zack at 466]. In practice, this has often meant that the opposing
party need only file a counter-affidavit which shows facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action or defense, and the averments would
be accepted as true for purposes of the motion regardless of whether
the "facts" would be admissible in court [See Jack v. Wood, 258
Cal. App. 2d 639, 65 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1968)]. The new statute
does not explicitly overrule this case-law doctrine, but nonetheless ap-
pears to accomplish just that result by now requiring both the support-
ing and opposing affidavits to be of admissible quality. The major
question is how the courts will interpret the new statute with respect
to the equality of materials demanded of the two parties. Of note
is the fact that the new statute does not change the burden of proof.
The movant party must still carry the burden of proving the absence
of any material issue of fact before the quality of the opposing party's
evidence becomes an issue [See Zack at 466; Swaffield v. Universal
Esco Corp., 271 Cal. App. 2d 147, 172, 76 Cal. Rptr. 680, 695
(1969)].
Seventh, if it appears from the opposition's affidavits that facts exist
which are essential to the opposing case, but which for some good
reason are not yet available, the judge can either deny the motion
for summary judgment (and thus let the facts surface or not in the
trial) or he can grant a continuance of the motion to permit the facts
to be gathered. While the legislature's intent appears to be one of
preventing injustice in those situations where the access to crucial facts
may be extremely difficult for the opposing party, it again raises the
question of judicial discretion in granting a summary judgment motion.
Provided the attorney opposing the motion gives the court a reasonably
credible presentation of both the potential existence of facts critical
to his opposition and his difficulty in getting at those facts, a court
which has followed the case-law approach of giving the most liberal
possible interpretation to the opposing party's affidavits can (as in
the past) simply deny the motion. The courts' interpretation and
the practicing attorneys' use of this provision will determine whether
it has, in effect, opened another "back door" to the legislature's appar-
ent intent to require equality of evidence between the two parties.
Perhaps the provision for a "penalty" for filing affidavits in bad faith
solely to cause delay will tend to deter any abuse of this procedure.
Eighth, the wording of the prior statute allowed for partial sum-
mary judgment with respect to a "cause of action." In an effort to
increase the use of partial summary judgments, the wording of the
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section in this area has been changed to "issue." Since the length of a
trial is directly related to the number of issues which must be argued,
any procedure which can get major issues adjudicated in advance of
the actual trial should result in saving considerable time and expense.
By making judicious use of this new procedure, attorneys can save
valuable court time and concentrate their efforts on issues they consider
vital.
Lastly, a striking new provision in the statute is the possibility that
if either party's affidavits are found to be in bad faith or introduced
solely to cause delays, that party can be ordered to pay the amount
of reasonable expenses incurred by the other party because of the
filing of those affidavits. This provision should instill a measure of
caution in those law firms which make a practice of producing a bliz-
zard of paperwork at the turn of an issue; but more importantly, it
raises the question of payment for attorneys' fees. California's general
practice has been not to allow attorneys' fees as costs unless specifi-
cally authorized by statute [See CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §1021]. But
the new statute specifies that "reasonable expenses" will be allowed,
which raises the possibility that judicial discretion may be used to
grant attorneys' fees. Such fees could be considered in the unusual
situation where the filing of improper or ineffective affidavits in sup-
port of motions for summary judgment was willful and flagrant.
Finally, an open question remains with respect to the relationship
between Section 437c and the equivalent federal rules of practice [See
FED. R. Civ. P. 56]. The new California statute now moves more
closely (but not completely) in line with federal provisions for granting
of summary judgment. At issue is whether the federal cases which
have been interpreting similar provisions over the past years now be-
come good precedent for California cases. Only time will illuminate
the attitude of our courts in accepting federal precedents in this area,
although the differences between the statutes are still sufficiently great
that there would appear to be good reason to build up a distinct line
of California cases in the area of summary judgment.
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Civil Procedure; transcription of testimony
Code of Civil Procedure § 1051 (repealed).
SB 209 (Deukmejian); STATS 1973, Ch 146
Support: Los Angeles Superior Court
Chapter 146 has repealed Section 1051 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, which allowed either party in a civil action to require the
court clerk to transcribe the testimony if a court reporter were required
to be present, but was absent. Repealing this statute eliminates a
potential problem caused by the fact that few court clerks have the
requisite skills to adequately function as court reporters. The re-
peal also avoids possible problems with an appeal based on questionable
court transcripts.
See Generally:
1) 1 WrraN, CALIFOlu-I PROCEDUmR, Transcript §404 et seq. (2d ed. 1970).
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